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Pay-as-you-go Social Security is typically characterized as a universal defined benefit pension
program. Implicit in this characterization is a sense that the participant’s investment in future
benefits is somehow guaranteed, or safe from risk. This study develops the concept of “political risk”
as the possibility that some future legislature will be forced to change the tax and benefit provisions
of  pay-as-you-go  social  security  programs,  when  there  are  changes  in  the  demographic  and
macroeconomic variables that support it. Thus there is a “political risk” to participants that might
be compared to the “market risk” in a personal accounts retirement scheme. In this paper, we carry
out a detailed quantitative analysis of political risk in the U.S. Social Security system, as well as an
overview of policy reforms in several European countries that demonstrate political risk more
broadly across social security systems. For the U.S., we compute the internal rates of return (IRRs)
from Social Security for various age groups and income levels, using the existing law in effect each
year  since  1939.  We  find  considerable  variation  in  IRRs  through  time  for  any  birth  cohort.
Participants experienced significant declines in IRRs as a result of adjustments made to restore the
system’s solvency in 1983 and 1994. If the system were brought into actuarial balance in 2005,
younger cohorts would experience another significant decline in their lifetime IRR. Our review of
other countries demonstrates political risk in other social security systems as well. Law changes 
necessitated by actuarial imbalances   pass demographic risk on to participants. The debate over
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I.  Introduction 
Pay-as-you-go Social Security is typically characterized as a universal defined 
benefit (DB) pension.  With this characterization, the debate surrounding the creation of 
personal accounts then becomes a choice between a safe DB plan and a risky defined 
contribution (DC) one.  While no one can argue against the fact that stock and bond 
returns are risky, the long-run rate of return from traditional Social Security depends on 
the future course of fertility rates, immigration rates, mortality rates and the growth rate 
of real wages.  There is considerable uncertainty about all four of these variables and 
hence traditional Social Security cannot be considered a safe asset.  The three 
demographic variables, for instance, produced a number of surprises in the last half of the 
twentieth century (the baby boom, the baby bust, the uneven pace of mortality 
improvement, etc.).  Shifts in demographics and macroeconomic variables render 
traditional Social Security vulnerable to political risk because legislated changes in taxes 
and benefits are required to restore actuarial balance.  Such adjustments undermine the 
“safe” benefits promised by traditional Social Security.  
We will argue that the characterization of traditional Social Security as a defined 
benefit retirement program is inappropriate.  An essential element of defined benefit 
pension programs is that the participants do not bear the funding risk.  That is, if the fund 
becomes underfunded (due to poor returns or a deviation between what actually happens 
and the actuarial assumptions), the funding inadequacy is not borne by the participants, 
but by the employer or an insurance entity.  The risks are transferred from the participants 
to others, leaving the workers with a safe benefit.  Of course, this is a characterization of 
DB plans; reality is somewhat different.  DB benefits remain risky because they are not 
indexed for inflation and because the risk transfer is incomplete.  The point here is that 
the funding risk (or at least most of the funding risk) is not borne by participants.   
Social Security doesn’t even approximate a DB plan.  The funding risk is borne 
by participants.  It isn’t transferred to anyone else.  In fact, since it is a nearly universal 
plan, it is impossible to think of who could insure the benefits for the participants.  What 
we are calling political risk in this paper could be thought of as funding risk.  The 
fundamental risks of Social Security are not being generated by politicians; they are   2
being generated by the demographic and economic factors affecting funding.  The 
politicians are simply an intermediary in the transmission of underlying risks. 
There exist several studies that have attempted to study and quantify various 
aspects of political risk.  Harris, Meyerson, and Smith (2001) and CBO (2001) study the 
impact of demographic and wage-growth risk on the trust fund balances.  Harris, 
Myerson, and Smith also do a comparative analysis of the risks of traditional Social 
Security and systems in which part or all of the trust fund assets are invested in private 
securities.  How the variability in the system’s finances translates into risk for individual 
participants is a more difficult question.  In our earlier work on this topic (Nataraj and 
Shoven 2003), we assumed that the Social Security system is run on a purely PAYGO 
basis, in which the payroll tax rate is fixed and all its proceeds are distributed in a lump-
sum fashion to the current elderly.  Within this framework, we ask whether individuals 
are better off with a pure PAYGO Social Security system (which is subject to political or 
funding risk because benefits are adjusted to reflect revenue), a pure defined contribution 
funded plan (which is subject to financial risk), or some combination of the two.  
Elementary portfolio theory suggests that “some of each” is the right answer.  Indeed, this 
is what we conclude: even very risk-averse participants desire a system with an 
individual accounts component.  
In reality, however, the Social Security system is not a pure PAYGO system.  
Both benefits and taxes are legislated for the indefinite future, with any excess revenue 
going into a trust fund.  We have argued (Nataraj and Shoven 2003) that the presence of a 
trust fund cannot serve as an effective smoothing device for individual returns – that is, 
the full impact of demographic and wage-growth risk must ultimately be borne by the 
system’s participants.  A persistent trust fund deficit will force policymakers to raise 
taxes or cut benefits.  The U.S. has already effectively cut promised benefits several 
times (e.g., by raising the normal retirement age and making part of benefits taxable) and 
similar adjustments have been necessary in many countries (e.g., Germany has increased 
the retirement age).  However, in order to understand the nature of political risk, it is 
important to investigate how governments respond to a divergence between assets and 
liabilities, and how this response passes demographic risk on to the system’s participants.   3
Existing studies that attempt to quantify individual-level political risk include 
McHale (2001), Blake and Turner (2003), and Schnabel (1998).  These papers examine 
the impact of particular law changes on measures of participants’ lifetime benefits.  
McHale shows that recent reforms undertaken by the U.S. and various European 
countries significantly reduced the social security wealth (defined as the present value of 
promised social security benefits) for a representative 45-year-old worker.  On the other 
hand, since reforms were phased in, workers who were at retirement age at the time of the 
reform were not affected much.  Blake and Turner examine the impact of recent law 
changes in the U.K. and the U.S. on the internal rates of return promised to 25-year-old 
workers.   The Schnabel paper is most like this one.  Schnabel calculates internal rates of 
return for different cohorts of participants in the German Social Security system.  He 
finds that returns decline for younger cohorts.  Real rates of return for those born in 1980 
range from zero to one percent, depending on assumptions.  He finds that roughly 80 
percent of contributions are implicit tax rates for this cohort.  He asserts that this is 
leading to compliance problems that threaten the stability of the German system. 
In this paper, we carry out a detailed analysis of political risk in the U.S., and an 
overview of recent law changes across several European countries.  For the U.S., we 
compute internal rates of return (IRRs) for various age groups under existing law in each 
year since 1939.  We find a considerable amount of variation in IRRs through time for a 
given birth cohort, a finding that is inconsistent with the characterization of Social 
Security as safe.  Participants experienced significant declines in their IRRs as a result of 
adjustments made to restore the system’s solvency in 1983 and 1994.  We also find that, 
if the system was brought into actuarial balance in 2005 (by raising the payroll tax), 
younger cohorts would experience a decline in their lifetime IRR of approximately 80 
basis points (0.8 percent).     We also confirm McHale’s finding that, historically, those at 
or near retirement age bear less political risk than younger workers.  It is not true, 
however, that retirees and those near retirement have always been exempt from benefit 
cuts.  In particular, increasing the income taxation of benefits is equivalent to reducing 
benefits.  Those steps, taken in the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S., applied to current and 
future beneficiaries alike.  Our study of recent law changes in European countries reveals 
that workers there also bear considerable demographic risk.  Germany, France, Sweden,   4
and Italy have all made fairly large benefit cuts in recent years and are faced with the 
prospect of making more.  Given the evidence of what has happened in the U.S. and in 
Europe, it is impossible to continue the notion that traditional Social Security is a defined 
benefit program with safe benefits. 
Our analysis suggests that political risk is inevitable in traditional Social Security.  
When a private employer runs a DB pension plan, both demographic and financial risk 
are borne by the firm’s shareholders.  Since shareholders must make up any funding 
shortfall in the system, workers can reasonably expect their benefits to be safe.  In a 
universal retirement system like Social Security, however, there is nobody outside the 
system to bear the funding risk.  Any funding shortfall must be paid by raising payroll 
taxes or cutting benefits.  Alternatively, the costs can be passed on to taxpayers; however, 
taxpayers and Social Security participants are essentially the same group.  Thus, 
demographic and economic risk makes it impossible to design a universal DB system.  
This fact is gradually being recognized in the design of pension systems.  The best 
example of this is Germany’s most recent reform, which explicitly links benefits to the 
dependency ratio through the use of a “sustainability factor.”  This means that 
participants not only bear the funding risk in the long run, but also that this risk is 
automatically transferred to them via the sustainability factor. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents our detailed analysis of 
law changes and their impact on returns for U.S. Social Security.  Section III describes 
recent law changes in Germany, France, Sweden, and Italy.  Section IV concludes. 
II.  Political Risk in the United States 
It is well known that internal rates of return (IRRs) in the U.S. Social Security 
system vary considerably by cohort; in particular, the earliest cohorts to retire under the 
system received significantly larger returns than more recent ones.  A less emphasized 
fact is that each individual cohort experiences variation over its lifetime in the IRR 
promised by the law.  Law changes often occur in response to accumulated demographic 
changes and therefore can be viewed as a reflection of demographic risk in the system.  
We define political risk as variation in IRR promised to Social Security participants 
under the law.  Another possible measure of political risk is variation in replacement rates   5
(e.g., McHale 2001).  However, we feel that IRR is a more appropriate measure because 
it also considers tax changes, which may be quite significant for young workers. 
  We consider all law changes to the Social Security retirement program from 1939 
to the present.  Towards the beginning of this period, most of the law changes worked to 
expand the system: a series of tax and benefit increases occurred between 1939 and 1972.  
There was a number of ad hoc benefit increases intended to compensate participants for 
inflation.  The form of these benefit increases was often a reduction in the number of 
years used in the computation of average monthly earnings.   In 1973, benefits were 
explicitly indexed to inflation, albeit in a flawed manner.  In 1978, wage indexation was 
introduced in the computation of average monthly earnings.  In response to demographic 
changes that shifted Social Security’s actuarial balance, tax increases were necessary in 
1977 and benefit cuts (in the form of subjecting benefits to income taxation) and further 
tax increases were introduced in 1983 (the Greenspan Commission reforms).  A greater 
proportion of benefits became taxable in 1994.  All of these recent reforms clearly reflect 
demographic risk being passed on to workers.  The 2005 Social Security Trustees Report 
estimates that an immediate 3.5 percentage point increase
1 in the payroll tax is required to 
bring the system into balance over the infinite horizon.  Again, this represents 
demographic risk that must be borne by the system’s participants. 
We study how these legislative changes have altered real IRRs for participants.  
For our base case, we consider single males from various birth-year cohorts from 1900 
through 1985.  We assume each individual is born on January 1 of the relevant year, 
starts working at age 20, retires at the normal retirement age, and lives until age 80.  The 
fixed lifespan is a simplification.  The rate of return variation due to individual mortality 
experience is not our central concern.  We are more concerned about the impact of tax 
and benefit law changes and changes in the expected rate of growth of real wages.   A 
more complete analysis would factor in the impact of changing mortality. 
We consider three types of wage earners – average, high (90
th percentile), and low 
(10
th percentile).  In order to simulate wage histories, we use Outgoing Rotation Groups 
from the 2001 and 2002 Current Population Survey to compute the wage for each of the 
three income levels for each age group.  We then divide this by the wage for the 
                                                 
1 This 3.5 percent number is for the intermediate set of economic and demographic assumptions.   6
corresponding income level across workers of all ages.   These ratios are shown in Figure 
1 for male, female, and all workers with average earnings; we use the male ratios in our 
simulations.  We take the wage for the relevant income level in each year of the worker’s 
life and use the age-wage ratio to arrive at a wage for the worker.  For example, consider 
an average male 30-year-old in 1950.  The national average annual wage in 1950 was 
$2,763.  According to our computations, a 30-year-old male earns 1.13 times the national 
average.  Therefore, our imputed wage for him in 1950 is ($2,763)(1.13) = $3,122.   
In computing the IRR for workers under a particular piece of legislation, we make 
several assumptions.  In our base case (“rational expectations”), workers assume that 
future inflation (measured by the CPI) and aggregate wage growth will be equal to the 
geometric average of the past 5 years.  After 1978, wage growth expectations are 
especially important because they are used to calculate expectations regarding the 
earnings cap, bend points, and indexing of past wages.  After 2005, inflation and wage 
growth are assumed to be 2.8 and 3.9 percent respectively, as per the Social Security 
Administration’s intermediate scenario in the 2005 Trustees Report.  There is, however, 
no uncertainty about the path of the individual’s wages; this allows us to isolate the 
impact of aggregate demographic risk, as opposed to individual-level earning risk.  Prior 
to 1972, benefits were not explicitly indexed to inflation.  It is reasonable that workers 
might expect adjustments to occur in the event of inflation.   However, this was not 
written into the law.  In the base case, our computation of IRRs in this pre-1972 period 
embodies the naïve expectation that no further changes will be made to the law to 
compensate for inflation or otherwise.  
The 1983 and 1993 law changes reduced benefits by subjecting them to income 
taxation.  In 1983, up to 50 percent of an individual’s benefit was subject to taxation; this 
proportion was raised to 85 percent in 1993 (taking effect in 1994).  However, benefits 
are only taxable for retirees with income above a certain level.   We assume that our 
average and 90
th percentile earners have sufficient retirement income to trigger income 
taxation, while our 10
th percentile earner does not.  The income tax rates are assumed to 
be 20 and 30 percent for average and 90
th percentile earners respectively. 
Since current Social Security is unsustainable, participants will certainly face 
benefit cuts or tax increases in the future (although the specifics have yet to be   7
determined).  Of course, from the perspective of a young worker, it makes little 
difference whether the payroll tax is raised or benefits are cut – both changes should have 
a similar impact on the IRR.  We feel that it is important to include some measure of this 
risk in our analysis.  This is risk that the politicians have yet to transfer to Social Security 
participants.  We assume that in 2005, the payroll tax is increased by 3.5 percentage 
points, enough to bring the system into actuarial balance over the infinite horizon.  
Our base case results are shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4 (for average, 90
th 
percentile, and 10
th percentile earnings respectively).  As is well known, earlier cohorts 
received significantly higher IRRs than more recent ones.  Moreover, higher income 
individuals receive lower IRRs.  The variation in the promised IRR over a cohort’s 
lifetime is significant, and this degree of variation does not appear to be related to 
income; that is, while the system is progressive, low-income individuals do not appear to 
be particularly insulated from political demographic risk.  Fluctuation in IRRs occurs for 
two reasons: law changes and changing expectations of future inflation and wage growth.  
The magnitude of the fluctuations is considerable.  For instance the IRR for the 1975 
cohort average earning single male (from Figure 3) was -0.95 percent in 1993; it rose to 
+2.04 percent by 2000 and fell to -0.39 percent by 2004. Workers’ expectations were 
updated to reflect strong real wage growth in the late 1990s, resulting in higher IRRs 
through wage indexation.  On the other hand, the impacts of the law changes are clearly 
seen in 1983 and 1994.  The IRRs for the average and high earners fall significantly as 
their benefits become subject to taxation.  Even the 10
th percentile earner is hurt by the 
1983 reform due to increases in the retirement age. 
The link between IRRs and wage growth raise an important point.  The main 
source of income to most Social Security participants is their human capital, or labor 
income, which is highly susceptible to aggregate wage growth risk.  Traditional Social 
Security forces its participants to take on even more of this risk by tying their return on 
their Social Security wealth to wage growth.  This is undesirable from a portfolio choice 
perspective.  In our previous work (Nataraj and Shoven 2003), we have argued that 
portfolio diversification makes a two-tier system, which combines demographic and 
financial risk, preferable to traditional Social Security.  Even if Social Security wealth is 
modeled as the present value of future benefits, it is not tied to the returns on capital.     8
An alternative to our rational expectations assumption is that workers perfectly 
foresee all future inflation and wage growth.  In this “perfect foresight” scenario, the only 
source of risk is law changes; macroeconomic variables are predicted with perfect 
accuracy.  We feel that this assumption is less realistic, as Social Security does expose 
participants to risk from changing inflation and wage growth.  However, the perfect 
foresight computation is useful as a sensitivity analysis and to isolate demographic risk 
that is passed on through law changes.  The perfect foresight results are shown in Figures 
5, 6, and 7 for average, high, and low earners respectively.   
Note that the changes in IRRs are more discrete than in the base case.  With 
perfect foresight, expectations do not get updated on an annual basis; therefore, the 
promised IRR changes only when the law does.  Again, it is clear that earlier cohorts 
were promised higher returns at any stage in their lives, and that low earners receive 
higher returns.  Moreover, the results also make it clear that low earners were relatively 
insulated from the most recent cuts in benefits (1983 and 1993).  This makes sense as the 
cuts took the form of (progressive) income taxation of benefits for high earners only.   
Our broad conclusions from the base case still stand.  Social Security participants 
face a significant amount of variation in the returns they get as a result of law changes.  
Law changes – necessitated by actuarial imbalances – pass demographic risk on to 
participants.  This risk can be considerable, which casts doubt on the characterization of 
traditional Social Security as safe.  One might wonder how political risk compares with 
the financial risk that participants would face with a system of individual accounts.  In 
our previous work (Nataraj and Shoven 2003), we showed that a 60-40 stock-bond 
portfolio provides a mean lifetime IRR of 6.2 percent with a standard deviation of 2.03 
percent.  In contrast, a pure pay-as-you-go system (in which benefits are updated every 
year to reflect demographic changes) generates a mean lifetime IRR of 1.02 with a 
standard deviation of 0.55 percent.  The risk and returns calculated in this paper are 
similar.  Between 1977 and 2004, the average IRR for an average earning single male in 
the 1960 birth cohort was 0.525 percent, while the standard deviation of the time series of 
IRRs was 0.8 percent.  There can be no doubt that the deal offered by Social Security has 
changed over the years.  The debate over personal accounts, therefore, is not one of 
“safe” versus “risky” benefits, but one of portfolio choice.   9
III.  Political Risk in Europe 
In Europe as well, many law changes have taken place – and more are still 
required – in order to deal with changing demographics.  In this section, we describe 
recent reforms in Germany, Italy, France, and Sweden.  A detailed list of the legislative 
changes can be found in Tables 1-4. 
Germany 
Germany’s demographic problem is significantly more severe than that of the 
U.S.  As discussed by Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004), Germany has experienced a faster 
increase in life expectancy and a more dramatic “baby bust.”  As a result, more than 25 
percent of the German population in 2030 will be over the age of 65; the dependency 
ratio is projected to be 43.3 percent.  At the end of the 1980s, policy makers realized that 
the existing replacement rate of 70 percent could only be maintained by raising the 
payroll tax from 19.5 to 40 percent by 2035.   
These demographic shifts have resulted in a number of reforms to the public 
pension system (see Table 1).  The first set of reforms was passed in 1989 and took effect 
in 1992.  The main change was to index benefits to net, rather than gross, wages.  The 
legislation also increased the normal retirement age and introduced benefit reductions for 
early retirement and benefit increases for late retirement, although these adjustments were 
less than actuarially fair.  A second set of reforms was enacted in 1997 and scheduled to 
take effect in 1999.  These reforms were supposed to introduce a “demographic factor” 
into the computation of benefits in order to index them to life expectancy.  However, this 
reform was revoked in 1998 before it took effect.  Only one part of the 1997 legislation – 
a gradual increase in retirement ages – was actually implemented as scheduled.  A third 
major reform was passed in 2001 and took effect in 2002.  This legislation curtailed 
increases in the payroll tax, constraining it to stay below 20 percent until 2020 and 22 
percent until 2030.  The replacement rate was lowered from 70 to 67 percent (of net 
wages).  In addition, a second funded tier was established; workers were given the option 
of investing 4 percent of their gross earnings into this system.  The definition of net 
earnings was adjusted to reflect this 4 percent contribution, making the effective fall in 
the replacement rate more than the stated 3 percentage points.  Using the old definition of 
net earnings, the new replacement rate is 63.5 percent.  The most recent set of reforms   10
was passed in 2004.  The main change was to index pensions to the dependency ratio by 
including a “sustainability factor” in benefit computations to reflect shortfalls in funding. 
These reforms have made it clear how vulnerable the German system is to 
demographic and funding risk.  Indeed, the “sustainability factor” introduced last year is 
an explicit recognition of this vulnerability.  German workers have begun to appreciate 
this risk as well: in recent years, there has been an increasing awareness that traditional 
pension benefits are not, in fact, safe.  As Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) explain: 
In the past, stability of [the benefit] formula has created a sense of 
actuarial fairness, so that workers perceived the contributions largely as 
insurance premia.  However, this has changed when the formula was 
altered several times since 1992 … Surveys show that by 2001, 
contributions were largely perceived as taxes (p. 15). 
Fehr and Habermann (2004) compute the impact of the “sustainability factor” reform on 
future replacement and contribution rates.  They find that the reform increases the 
variability of the replacement rate (by tying it explicitly to the dependency ratio) and 
reduces the variability of the contribution rate (as it will no longer have to vary as much 
to meet the replacement rate target).  
France 
In France, a study in the early 1990s showed that the contribution rate for the 
PAYGO system (then 17 percent for the private sector) would need to rise by 50 to 100 
percent by 2040 to sustain the average replacement rate of 80 percent of net wages 
(Blanchet and Legros 2002).   The first major reform occurred in 1993 (see Table 2).  The 
main provisions of this reform were to index pensions to prices rather than wages; to 
increase in the number of years used in the computation of average wages; and to 
increase the career length required to receive full benefit.  Each of these measures 
constitutes benefit reductions.  According to Blanchet and Legros (2002), the first two 
provisions substantially lowered the cost of the program, while the impact of the third 
was minimal.  They further state that after the reform, the contribution rate would still 
need to rise by 70 percent by 2040.   
Additional reforms took place in 2003 and included increases in the required 
career length for full benefits; bonuses for working beyond the age of 60 or the required 
minimum career length; and an increase in the minimum pension for low-wage workers.    11
The main effect of the reform was to increase retirement ages (Benallah et. al. 2005).  As 
the system continues to face a substantial long-run actuarial deficit, further tax and 
benefit adjustments appear inevitable. 
Sweden 
  Sweden’s traditional PAYGO system faced severe demographic pressures, 
particularly from low birth rates and rapidly improving life expectancies.  The roughly 
18.5 percent payroll tax rate was projected to rise to as high as 36 percent by 2025 in 
order to maintain the old benefit structure (Normann and Mitchell 2000).  The Swedish 
parliament agreed to sweeping reforms in 1994 and passed the implementation legislation 
in 1998.  The new system completely replaces the traditional system of formula-based 
benefits with a two-pillar system consisting of a PAYGO notional defined contribution 
component (with a 16 percent contribution rate), and a fully funded individual account 
system (with a 2.5 percent contribution rate).  The notional DC individual accounts still 
operate on a PAYGO basis, with the “account balance” being credited with “earnings” 
tied to the growth in per capita wages.  Participants can choose from a variety of pension 
funds for their 2.5 percent funded individual account.  
  The effect of switching to a combination of defined contribution accounts 
(notional and funded) means that the system is automatically adjusted to changes in life 
expectancy (through the annuitization of the accounts at retirement), that longer careers 
and later retirement are rewarded, and that fluctuations in the rate of growth of real wages 
are borne by participants through the crediting of their notional accounts.  The notional 
accounts, thus, reflect risk in the growth of real wages while the funded accounts are 
subject of capital market returns.  Rather than face the prospect of 36 percent tax rates, 
the total contribution rates are now scheduled to remain fixed at 18.5 percent.  
Interestingly, Sweden’s system of employer provided pensions has largely converted 
from DB to DC plans in tandem with the reform.   
Italy 
  Italy’s pension faces financial problems because of its low fertility rate (1.2 births 
per woman of childbearing age) and the resulting increase in the dependency ratio, which 
is expected to reach 48 percent by 2030 (Franco 2002).  Reforms were undertaken in 
1992 (see table 3) and included an increase in the retirement age; an increase in the   12
number of years of earnings used in the benefit computation; a shift from wage to price 
indexation of benefits; and an increase in the required career length for receiving a 
pension.  These reforms collectively reduced the liabilities of the system (and therefore 
the retirement wealth of its participants) by 25 percent.  Reforms passed in 1996 included 
the introduction of a defined contribution component, the indexation of benefits to life 
expectancy, and the abolition of a guaranteed minimum pension level.   
  The reforms undertaken thus far are still inadequate to restore balance to the 
system.  Two current proposals are to allow policymakers to revise the benefit formula 
more frequently, and to add additional demographic factors to the benefit formula.  Both 
of these proposals reflect recognition of demographic risk, which is inevitable in a 
traditional Social Security system.  While not as explicit as Germany’s “sustainability 
factor”, Italy’s proposed reforms make an implicit commitment to revise benefit formulas 
in the case of funding shortfalls. 
IV.  Conclusion 
The main point of the paper is that traditional PAYGO Social Security such as the 
systems in U.S. and Europe are not comparable to private sector defined benefit 
retirement plans.  There is no third party insuring the benefits of the participants in these 
plans.  Workers are never vested in their benefits.  The benefit formulas and the 
contribution rates can, have been, and will be changed as necessary for financial 
sustainability.  The result is that traditional Social Security programs offer risky returns to 
their participants, with most of that risk stemming from demographic and productivity 
(real wage) factors.  Once the riskiness of traditional Social Security is recognized, then 
the discussion of funded individual accounts should become one of asset diversification. 
  We have shown the fluctuations in the rate of return offered by U.S. Social 
Security have been considerable due to periodic law changes and changes in the growth 
of real wages.  We have also reviewed the relatively fast pace of change in European 
systems.  The two most dramatic examples of change (and risk borne by participants) are 
in Germany, where a sustainability factor has been added to the benefit formula (and 
where payroll tax rates have been capped), and in Sweden, where the entire defined 
benefit system has been replaced with a two-tier defined contribution plan.   13
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Table 1: Law Changes In Germany 
Enacted Effective  Law change  Impact 
1989 1992 
● Pensions indexed to net, rather than 
gross, wages and salaries 
● Increases in retirement ages (63 to 65 
for men beginning in year 2000 and 
ending in 2001;  60 to 65 for women 
beginning in year 2000 and ending in 
year 2006) 
● Partial actuarial adjustments for 
early/late retirement (reduction of 
pension by 0.3 % for each month of early 
retirement and increase of pension by 0.5 
% for each month of late retirement) 
● Shortening of contribution-free periods 
(e.g. military service & education) 
● Higher transfer from the Federal 
Employment Office for the unemployed 
● Pensions grow at a slower rate 
● Provided disincentive for early retirement 
and incentive for late retirement 
● Special pension benefits reduced 
1997 1999 
● Gradual change of eligibility age for 
the unemployed and women from 60 to 
65 
● No distinction between men and 
women after 2015 
● Unemployment retirement will be 
abolished after 2007 
● Part-time retirement made impossible 
after 2007 
● Effective retirement ages increased by 2 
years 
2001 2002 
● Contribution rates stabilized (must stay 
below 20% until 2020 and below 22% 
until 2030) while net replacement rate 
must stay above 67% 
● Pension levels(including 
supplementary pensions) gradually 
reduced from 70% to 67~68% 
replacement levels 
● 4% of gross earnings invested into the 
new funded supplementary pension 
(voluntary) 
● Supplementary pensions subsidized by 
tax deferral, tax deduction, and direct 
subsidies 
● Aimed at limiting non-wage labor costs and 
achieving a fairer balance of intergenerational 
burden 
● Actual pension levels fall by 10% to 63.5% 
due to the supplementary pension 
● Demand for voluntary supplementary 
pensions moderate (35% of all eligible 
workers in 2003) 
● Supplementary pensions expected to 
compensate for the reductions in PAYGO 
scheme for younger cohorts but not 
necessarily for older cohorts 
● Replacement rates expected to fall below the 
minimum set at 67% and contribution rates 
rise above the maximum set at 20% 
● Transition generation will bear a larger 
burden (need 8% savings rate to cover the 
loss) 
2004 ? 
● Include a “sustainability factor” in the 
benefit formula to reflect the system 
dependency ratio that considers not only 
the development of life expectancy but 
also other demographic changes (e.g. 
migration and birth rates) 
● Administrative changes to encourage 
subscriptions to supplementary pensions 
● Gradual increase in normal retirement 
age from 65 to 67 along with 
corresponding increase in early 
retirement ages starting in 2011 until 
2035 (not yet legislated) 
● “Sustainability factor” gives the pension 
benefit formula a self-stabilizing effect 
● Supplementary pensions made more popular 
and transparent 
● Contribution rates maintained below the 
maximum level 
Sources: 1989/1992 reform from Rürup (2002); 2001/2002, and 2004 reforms from Börsh-Supan and Wilke 
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Table 2: Law Changes in France 
Enacted Effective  Law  Change  Impact 
1993 1993 
● Pensions indexed to prices, instead of 
wages 
● Gradual increase of number of 
contribution years required for full pension 
benefits from 37.5 to 40 years over 10 
years for private-sector employees 
● Number of years used to compute 
pension increased from 10 to 25 years over 
15 years 
● Contained pension expenditures through 
benefit cuts at the expense of substantially 
reduced replacement rates and lower standard 
of living for the retirees 
● Increase in the required contribution years 
had minimal impact, while the new indexation 
and increased number of years used to 
compute pension enabled the reduction in 
expenditure 
2003  
● Number of contribution years required 
for full pension increased to 40 for public-
sector employees by 2008 
● Above number will increase up to 41 for 
both public- and private-sector employees 
by 2012. This number will be kept 
modified in line with changing life 
expectancy 
● Introduction of bonus of 3% per year for 
workers working beyond 60 and beyond 
the required years up to maximum 5 years 
● Minimum pension for low-wage workers 
who have completed the contribution years 
required for full pension increased 
● Aimed to increase effective retirement age 
● Replacement rates further reduced 
Sources: 1993 reform from Blanchet and Legros (2002); 2003 reform from Bernallah et. al. (2005).  
 
Table 3: Law Changes in Sweden 
Enacted Effective  Law  Change  Impact 
1994/1998 2001 
● Two-pillar model of NDC (Notional 
Defined Contribution) PAYGO and a 
mandatory FDC (Fully Funded Individual 
Accounts) system established 
● Pre-reform overall contribution rate of 
18.5% maintained (16% to PAYGO + 
2.5% to the advanced funded scheme) 
● Both accounts converted into annuities 
at retirement 
● Annuities based on lifetime account 
values at retirement, life expectancy of 
the cohort, a real rate of return on 
accounts. 
● Individually chosen funds (500 choices 
in 2000) with no restriction on fund’s 
portfolio composition 
● Occupational pension schemes 
transformed into FDC scheme 
● No fixed retirement age, but earliest 
age to receive pension set at 61 
● Old Universal Benefits and 
Supplementary Benefits replaced by 
Universal Guarantee Pension 
● The size of this pension graduated in 
accordance with the two contributory 
public retirement benefits (NDC and 
FDC) 
● Creation of a more financially stable system, 
emulating a pure insurance model 
● Funded component fit into the overall 
system without creating a new tax for future 
generations 
● Replacement rates are similar as before at 
around 70%. 
● Risks of increasing longevity shifted to 
individuals and intergenerational imbalance 
reduced 
● Established actuarially fair system that 
erases impediments to continued work 
● Indexation to wage-growth improved 
financial sustainability 
● Funded component increased national 
savings 
● More individual autonomy 
● Future benefits more uncertain 
● The pensions of people born in 1954 and 
later will be fully calculated in accordance 
with the new benefit formula. Pensions of 
people born between 1938 and 1953 will be 
determined by a combination of old and new 
rules. 
● Basic security ensured through a universal 
guarantee pension 
Sources: Palmar (2002), Palme (2005)   20
Table 4: Law Changes in Italy 
Enacted Effective  Law  Change  Impact 
1992 1993 
● Increase in the normal retirement age 
for private-sector employees (55 to 60 for 
women; 60 to 65 for men) 
● Reference period for calculating 
pension-able earnings lengthened from 5 
to 10 years; for young workers it was 
expended to the whole working life 
● Increase in the minimum number of 
years of contributions to receive old age 
pension from 15 to 20 years 
● Pensions indexed to prices, instead of 
wages 
● Minimum number of years of 
contribution required for public-sector 
employees to be entitled to a seniority 
pension raised to 35, same as private-
sector employees 
● Restrictions in the special eligibility 
conditions applying to public-sector 
employees 
● Adjustment of pensions to price 
temporarily limited 
● Disbursement of new seniority pension 
curtailed 
● Partially succeeded at limiting the ratio of 
public pension expenditure to GDP (about 
one-fourth of net pension liabilities canceled) 
● Reduced imbalances that create unfair 
advantages/disadvantages for certain groups 
(i.e. pension levels for younger workers linked 
to lifetime contribution) 
● More equalized treatment of public-sector 
and private sector employees 
● Cuts unevenly distributed: reduction of 8% 
for pensioners, 37% for long contributory 
records, 42% for short or discontinuous 
records 
● Long transition period and uneven 
distribution of reform burden due to exclusion 
of individuals with at least 15 years of 
contributions from changes 
● Failed to tackle seniority pension 
1995 1996 
● Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined 
Contribution system 
● Old age pension proportional to the 
value of accrued social security benefits, 
instead of recent final earnings 
● Pensions linked to the average life 
expectancy at the age of retirement 
● Workers allowed to choose a 
retirement age between 57 and 65 
● Guaranteed minimum pension level 
abolished 
● Seniority pension gradually abolished 
● Minimum number of years of 
contribution required for old age pension 
reduced 
● Aimed at reducing distortion effects of labor 
income tax through actuarial adjustments 
● Removed favorable treatment of workers 
with short or dynamic careers 
● Introduction of new pension benefit formula 
avoided the need to explicitly modify 
parameters, making cuts benefit cuts more 
acceptable 
● Liabilities of the private-sector pension 
scheme increased (4~9% of GDP) 
● Implementation of the reform extremely 
slow, just as the reform of 1992 (only 
individuals starting to work after 1995 will 
receive pensions computed only on the basis 
of new rules) 
Current Proposals 
● Faster implementation of the reforms enacted in 1992 and 1995 
● Accelerate the development of supplementary pension funds through tax deductions 
● Shift in the old age retirement bracket (from 57 ~ 65 to 62 ~70) 
● Provide an incentive to postpone retirement 
● More frequent revisions of the parameters in the benefit formula 
● Increase the number of factors in the benefit formula reflecting demographic and 
economic changes 
Source: Franco (2002). 
 
 